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REPLY ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
PAROL EVIDENCE ADMITTED BY TRIAL COURT 
OVER DEFENDANT'S OBJECTION SHOULD NOT 
HA VE BEEN CONSIDERED. 
Plaintiff-Respondent's apparent reliance on letters exchanged 
between the parties prior to the execution of the Agreements is improper in 
view of the Parol Evidence Rule. Respondent refers to the subject three 
Agreements as an "integrated contract to buy and sell a business". (Respon-
dent's Brief, page 1). Defendant-Appellant argued at trial that the subject 
three Agreements were complete on their face and that each should be 
considered as an integrated Agreement. Whether the Agreements were in-
tegrated individually or as a body, such integration precludes consideration 
of prior parol evidence. Futhermore the letters do not add clarification as 
to the intent of the parties regarding survivability of a payment obligation, 
and therefore should not be admissible as parol evidence. The trial court 
should therefore have confined itself to the provision's expressly stated in 
the documents constituting the three Agreements. 
POINT II 
PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT HAS NOT SHOWN THAT 
THEALLOCATION STATED IN THE AGREEMENTS IS 
UNREASONSABLE, NO EVIDENCE OF VALUATION 
HA YING BEEN GIVEN. 
The first letter of Plaintiff's Exhibit 4 states that Parks offered to pur-
chase the business based on three allocations totalling $180, 000. From the very 
beginning, the Covenant Not to Compete was considered essential, being 
valued at $60, 000. Its appearance as part of the whole transaction is merely 
a reflection of the practical reality that such sales transactions always occur 
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as a package. Furthermore, such restrictive covenants must be incident 
to a sale to be valid. Plaintiff-Respondent has presented no evidence to s:. 
that the initial $60, 000 allocation was "merely formal". To the contrary, 
independent significance of this covenant is apparent from the overall reco: 
The second letter shows a new set of figures which apparently resu. 
from Rudd's rejection of the first offer. No evidence is presented as tow! 
the changes occurred, except that they were prompted by Rudd to obtain a 
higher total value of $192, 000. Speculation is not a proper method of divir 
ing the meaning of such modifications. The only facts are ( 1) that Parks 
and Rudd negotiated after the first offer and (2) the allocation was reduced 
equipment and increased for the Covenant Not to Compete. 
Significantly, both changes present adverse tax consequences of wb. 
Rudd was undoubtedly aware. Nevertheless, it was his decision to require 
these changes from the original offer made by Parks. Defendant-Appellan· 
submits that it is not proper for Plaintiff-Respondent to speculate on the 
"arbitrary" nature of changes, when such changes were apparently caused 
Rudd himself. Justification for the actual allocation might have been deve 
at trial if Plaintiff-Respondent had placed the allocations in issue by evide: 
showing that the equipment and good will valuations were grossly unreasor. 
Since the initial offer and bargaining started with a $60, 000 Covenant Not I 
Compete, and since it was the action of Rudd which caused the increase to 
$95, 000, such a change should not be a detriment to Parks' position. Thi: 
is especially true where no evidence is given to explain the change other 
than Rudd's desire for more money. 
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POINT III 
HEIRS ARE NOT PRIVY TO COVENANT NOT TO 
COMPETE, ESPECIALLY WHERE SUCH COVENANT 
TERMINATES AT DEATH. 
The fact that the heirs have not competed is irrelevant. Their 
age and lack of involvement in creating the good will of the business clearly 
show that their forbearance from competition was neither bargained for, 
nor considered significant. Neither is there significance in a promise to 
forbear where no legal basis for such promise exists. 
Referring to the quoted authority for contract survival under Point 
II of Plaintiff-Respondent's Brief, Defendant-Appellant suggests the opposite 
interpretation. The CJS reference Vol. l 7A, p. 626 states, " ... a contract 
will be construed as subject to a condition of survirorship only when the 
continued existence of a party is assumed as the basis of the agreement." 
Had Rudd not been living at the time the Agreements were negotiated, there 
would have~ !!2. Covenant Not to Compete. It is therefore obvious that his 
existence was in fact "the basis of the agreement". Likewise, the Am Jm 
reference states, 
"The test for determining whether a particular contract is discharged 
by death has been said to be whether it is of such character that it 
may be performed by the promisor's personal representative ... " 
17 AM Jur. 2d 865 
The law with regard to this issue is well settled, Specifically, the personal 
representative of Hyman Rudd does not have the capacity to perform under 
the covenant, since she had no involvement with the creation of good will. 
The character of performance is unique to only Hyman Rudd. Plaintiff-
Respondent has cited no authority to the contrary. 
_,_ 
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POINT IV 
PAYMENT UNDER THE COVENANT NOT TO COMPETE 
WAS COORDINATED WITH THE PERIOD OF NON-
COMPETITION, SHOWING THE DEPENDENCE OF 
PAYMENT ON PERFORMANCE. 
Plaintiff-Respondent suggests that the court should read the obligat 
of promisor and promisee as separate agreements to (1) pay a total sum oi 
$95, 000, independent of (2) forbearance by Rudd from competition. Plaint 
further states that the time period of performance for each party "are not 
identical date intervals and show them to be totally independant and severe1 
of each other". To the contrary, the payment period was precisely five yei 
as was the period for noncompetition. In fact, there was an initial balloon 
payment of $6, 500 so that the $1, 500 monthly payments wouid terminate at 
the end of the fifth year. The only difference in performance periods was i 
shift of the date for commencement of payments until after January 1st. 
Undoubtedly, this was for the purpose of splitting the large payments of $1' 
and $6, 500 into separate tax years for Rudd. Therefore, it is apparent thz 
the payment obligation was integrally connected to performance by Rudd. 
POINT V 
THE ULMAN CASE DOES NOT INVOLVE A COVENANT 
NOT TO COMPETE IN CONNECTION WITH THE SALE 
OF A BUSINESS, AND IS THEREFORE NOT ON POINT. 
Plaintiff-Respondent relies on the case of Ulmann vs. Sunset-Meli!, 
as its only authority in favor of survivorship of a covenant not to compete, 
This case is clearly distinguishable, however, since is not a covenant 
incidental to the sale of a business. To the contrary, the covenant was 
in reality a pension plan for a 23 year employee of Sunset-McKee Co. who 
-4-
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retired with the expectation of receiving $150 a month for three years as 
pension payments. The instant case does not deal with employee/ employer 
obligations, nor is it based on a vested interest developed by a long record 
of service. The subject Covenant Not to Compete stands on its own consid-
eration and merits, and should be subject to termination at death on the same 
premises as the only case exactly on point - Keller vs. California Liquid 
Gas Corp. 
Dated this 10th of November, 1978. 
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